California
Tuesday, August 26th, 2003Like some of my fellow citizens, I have been catching up on the state of California, my adopted home for the last eight years.
The more I learn about the political culture and history of this, the most populous state in the union, the more I am ashamed to have been so ignorant of its leading political figures for so long.
Adding to this humbling experience is the realization that I should and could have known better, primarily due to the 1998 publication date of a book called “Paradise Lost” by Peter Schrag.
Suffice to say that whatever cogent ideas are to be found in the highly publicized and perennially hip book “City of Quartz” by Mike Davis they are outnumbered and rendered far more clearly — and systemically — by Schrag’s highly erudite and gripping account.
“Paradise Lost” is a page-turner with footnotes — and, perhaps, thanks to my previous if superficial relationship with many of his sources, from the state’s Legislative Analyst’s Office to the California Budget Project, those footnotes actually prove useful and unambiguous.
After a week during which I’ve read David Broder’s “Democracy Derailed” (on the initiative process in California, among other states), Schrag’s book and, during email breaks, countless stories on the Web about Golden State politics, I feel like I’ve gotten the political science education I never wanted when I was in school.
A few weeks ago, prior to my bath in the river of history, I asked whether the California gubernatorial recall election could be seen as a decision about progress and, thus, teleology, taking the occasion to reflect on Christianity and its offerings on the question.
Since then, Alabama has emerged as a more deserving candidate for my theological arguments while California, though undoubtedly in the throes of a highly ideological political crisis, has shifted quite clearly into the realm of the word made flesh — of fact rather than fantasy.
Yes, California is deciding on the question of progress. But this decision is shaped largely — if obliquely, as if a re-enactment of Plato’s Cave — by figures and factors that are not of a metaphysical nature.
Instead, we are dealing with the repercussions of a series of specific decisions, most written into law — and the highest law of this land, at that, the state constitution — and their equivalent in fiscal policy. Dollars and cents. Wealth and poverty. Freedom and power.
The specifics of this story are outlined, persuasively, in the August issue of the California Journal as well as in an essay on the recall election and its antecedents published by The Nation and penned by Schrag, himself. A longer, less eloquent version follows.
Preface
By way of introduction and warning, the following account attempts to skirt partisan politics and the role of money, of corporate and private interests, then and now, in the history of California’s political culture. Perhaps, this is a futile effort. Whether it makes this cursory summary useless or useful, I cannot say. Finally, this timeline does not discuss the specifics of the effort to recall Gray Davis.
1900-1978
California’s political framework, its constitution, is forever altered by a reform movement that swept the nation in the early 1900s. The goal of this reform was to limit the power of a corrupt legislature by reducing its powers and increasing those of the general populace through such instruments as the recall, the referendum and the initiative.
Because the United States is a democratic republic, its leaders are entrusted with decision-making powers. The people, the demos, are, in turn, entrusted with choosing the decision-makers. This relationship was modified by the reformers when they gave the people the ability to draft and pass laws without consulting or requiring the approval of the legislature.
However, because many of the reformers who sought to add these tools to American politics were themselves elected into office (e.g., President Theodore Roosevelt and Governor Hiram Johnson in California), the recall, referenda and initiative were used sparingly for more than half a century after their adoption. The reformers and their progressive campaign had become part of the institution, to positive effect.
During the 50 years that followed, California grew, mostly after — and, perhaps, as a result of — World War II. That growth was magnified by the creation of a society and accompanying political program that approved of and benefited from massive construction projects [.PDF, see pp. 35-44] which ranged in kind from education to water infrastructure to the state’s highway system. Of course, all this massive public spending depended upon massive public revenues which in turn were generated by such financial instruments as property taxes, income taxes and the sales tax.
In 1962, California becomes the most populous state and is generally regarded as one of the best places to live — largely as a result of the social and political cohesion that is driving and financing its growth. By the mid to late 1960s, however, these same engines of change would confront reality in a variety of discomforting guises — from socio-cultural to economic upheaval as well as the start of a major shift in California’s demographics. [PDF]
In 1962, Cesar Chavez organized the National Farm Workers Association in Fresno. In 1963, the California legislature passed the Rumford Act, banning racial discrimination in sales or rentals of housing. In 1964, the same year that the federal Civil Rights Act was passed by the U.S. Congress, California voters passed Prop 14, a constitutional amendment initiative to repeal the Rumford Act and its fair housing mandate. In 1965, the African-American community of Watts in Los Angeles erupted in a six day-long riot.
1978-1996
Nevertheless, many of the larger projects which created California’s vast infrastructure and enabled its wealth and economic well-being would be completed despite this turbulence. However, the fallout of these socio-political changes would coincide with widespread economic problems in the 1970s to create a crisis in values that culminated with the passage of Prop 13, an initiative that amended the constitution so as to limit the amount of money the state could raise via (quite inefficient) property taxes.
The passage of Prop 13 set off a national movement that would later be credited with the Reagan presidency and numerous other legislative — rather than plebiscitarian — changes to the state and the nation’s political landscape. It continues to be called a “tax revolt.” In fact, a second constitutional tax-cutting initiative, authored by one of the proponents of Prop 13 and marketed as the “Spirit of 13” would pass a few years later.
The loss in revenues and related restrictions on future tax laws — both the consequences of this one instance of “direct democracy” — forced local government to rely on state government for monies in order to meet its obligations and eventually led the state government, with its now limited powers to raise revenue, to a perennial deficit.
This deficit coincided with a Republican governor (and White House), a Democratic legislature (controlled by urban, minority-group liberals), a rapid growth in the state’s immigrant population and the continuing freeze in the growth of the middle-class, white population for whom the California Dream of the 50s and 60s was supposedly designed.
One possible cause for this demographic shift is attributed to the 1986 passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act. Signed into law by President Reagan, a former governor of California, the IRCA gave amnesty to millions of illegal immigrants — mainly from Latin America — and, perhaps, spurred them to petition the INS on behalf of their spouses, children and parents. All told, the population of California increased one and half-times between 1970 and 1990. California received over 34% of all immigrants to the U.S. in the 1980s.
By the late 1980s, the governor of California (Republican) was taking money out of K-12 education funds in order to pay for the services no longer financed by property taxes. His decision to do so many not have been helped by the legislature’s apparent inability to confront the fall-out of the “tax revolt” with pragmatic resolve. It should be noted that since 1933, California has required a super-majority consensus or two-thirds vote by the legislature to pass its budget and partisan tensions have seldom made that process efficient.
Because education continues to be a “push-button” issue for Californians, the siphoning of money from K-12 education funds led to yet another constitutional amendment, Prop 98. Whereas other initiatives had attempted — and failed — to modify the anti-tax amendments of the preceding decade, Prop 98 avoided the question of financing altogether and simply offered to set a constitutional baseline for K-12 education spending.
In a pattern than has continued to this day, Prop 98 presented a solution without any concern for its cost. While it prevented future governors and legislators from taking funds out of education, it encouraged them to take funds out of other programs: welfare, health care — nevermind infrastructure.
Likewise, the problem of the urban, minority-group liberals who controlled the legislature — i.e., State Assembly Speaker, Willie Brown — would be summarily solved. Another constitutional amendment, also introduced via the initiative process as Prop 140, set term limits which prevent California’s legislators from serving more than a single term in the Assembly and no more than two terms in the state Senate.
The same initiative also nearly halved the number of professional staffers that could be hired by legislators to sort out the fiscal and policy concerns of the state that ranks as one of the six largest economies in the world. Such term and resource limits were not imposed on lobbyists who can remain in contact with the legislature for decades and hire as many experts as they can afford.
In the early 1990s, California suffers a recession. It is possible that some manufacturing had leaked out of the state in the 1980s, possibly as a result of the emphasis on sales taxes that Prop 13 foisted upon local governments. When presented with competing development projects, regional planners would choose retail facilities over manufacturing in order to earn sales taxes and recoup the loss of property tax funds lost to Prop 13.
During this economic downturn, the new governor, Pete Wilson, raised taxes (eventually reducing them for the highest income bracket earners and corporations), took flak for doing so, and, eventually, settled upon a series of initiatives that could bolster his standing in both the general population and among fellow GOP politicians who had harshly criticized his use of taxes despite the circumstances.
Those democratic initiatives, now serving the interests not only of well-heeled private parties but, remarkably, of an elected politician, would amend the constitution to exclude illegal immigrants from a variety of public services (including U.S. citizens born to illegal immigrants) through Prop 187, create mandatory sentencing guidelines for persons convicted of a third felony (violent or not) through Prop 184, and abolish affirmative action programs managed by the state government through Prop 209.
In each of these cases, as with Prop 13 and Prop 98 before them, an undeniable problem that may or may not have been gradually resolved through legislative reforms, possibly involving the general population, were dealt with quickly and without room for future adjustments. In fact, a mandatory-sentencing law had already been passed by legislators the year before Prop 184 was put to vote. Moreover, a competing measure would have made a distinction between violent and non-violent offenses (e.g., stealing a bicycle or videotapes).
The importance of allowing for future adjustments cannot be understated. Laws respond to a changing set of factors: from federal funding to economic developments, from judicial rulings to demographics trends. Constitutional amendments, on the other hand, are fixed — regardless of the reality on the ground.
Moroever, here is an instance of a governor using an instrument of the general population to enact laws that would otherwise be crafted in a deliberative process between his office and that of the legislative branch of government. In the end, all of these initiatives would be challenged by the courts — the third branch. Wilson would be unsuccessful in his bid for re-election as well as his campaign for president.
1996-2003
However, the political, social and economic consequences of these three measures would endure.
The rhetoric of alien exclusion, which was used to push through an issue of federal vs. state fiscal policy (the federal government had reneged on promises to compensate California for the influx of illegal immigrants, an influx probably precipitated by federal decisions — to say nothing of U.S. foreign policy), resulted in a very strident symbolic rebuke of all immigrants, particularly Mexican and Latin Americans.
Though this initiative failed a constitutional test — a test that, given California’s initiative system, can only be applied after an election and, thus, after tens of millions of dollars in television ads and similarly manipulative propaganda — the issue continues to linger on the edges of the state’s political discourse.
The sentencing amendment did pass muster, all the way up to the U.S. Supremer Court. As a result, California’s prison system has expanded at a rate that is several times that of the other most populous states. The cost of such expansion has come out of that shrinking portion of the state’s budget which is left after Prop 98 takes its share. It has also elevated the power of the prison guards union (just as Prop 98 has propped up the teachers union).
Because Prop 13 ties state revenues to income and sales taxes, the national recession which began in 1999 has cost California a great deal of its funding. There is less money to go around and more mandates to spend what little of it is left.
Governor Davis, elected in 1996 and re-elected in 2000, benefited from the boom of the late 90s but apparently did not care to prepare for the all-but-predestined bust. As a result, none of the structural and mutually exclusive demands written into the state’s constitution were addressed during his first term. Nor are the largely inexperienced legislators swept in by term limits — and, apparently, disinvested in any long-term solutions given their short-term agendas — making any effort to address the implications of the past for present and future needs.
Adding to the legislative gridlock in Sacramento are three decades of reapportionment which have allowed both parties to carefully carve out safe districts for their members. By 2003, the percentage of electoral districts where Republican and Democratic candidates for the legislature primarily compete against members of their own party for election is estimated at 86%. This lack of bipartisan competition at the polls has resulted in ever more ideologically orthodox politicians for whom compromise is seldom necessary or expedient — regardless of the outcome for the state’s 32 million residents.
Meanwhile, the demographics of California continue to shift towards an evermore diverse — and, for the moment, polarized — population. On the one hand are the still largely disenfranchised (non-voting) majority of minorities — mostly immigrant, many with Latin American roots — and their limited economic and educational prospects. On the other hand is an aging white populace, middle class, most of whom vote, many of whom will may turn to tomorrow’s government coffers for assistance with medical costs and related services.
Finally, the voters of California have been asked to use an instrument of direct democracy yet again to intervene in a system that is largely considered broken because of both a lack of courage on the part of legislators and a lack of legislative foresight on the part of voters who have been sold on the initiative as the political equivalent of such American panaceas as the diet pill, the credit card, plastic surgery and lawsuits. Sold, that is, by mass media which collects the lion’s share of campaign spending (through advertising) while mostly overlooking the legislative process.
It is, nonetheless, a remarkable moment for the citizen-as-legislator. For all the damage done by previous plebiscites, with their hit-and-run approach to problem-solving, at least 100 private citizens have paid the $3,500 fee to run for governor. While they will not win out over the well-heeled interests that have determined the outcome of most initiative and legislative races in recent history, they do at least represent a willingness on behalf of the citizen-as-legislator to rise to the occasion and spend more than 20 minutes of their time on the future of California — and, possibly, its history and current of opportunities.
postscript
A more concise and entertaining version of the above appeared in the L.A. Weekly by D. J. Waldie.